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INTRODUCTION 
The post-World War II decades witnessed one of the most important economic 
achievements in recent world history: the rise of Japan as a global economic 
power. This served notice of Japan's new status as an actor on the world stage 
and ultimately, of its potential to influence developments around the world. In 
the South Pacific1, Japan's drive to globalise its giant economy over a period of 
four decades generated a considerable impact on the economies of Pacific 
Islands countries (PICs). In the period leading up to the mid-1970s, relations 
between Japan and the South Pacific developed gradually with a continuing 
emphasis on economic involvement initially through trade and investment. 
That economic relationship expanded rapidly during the 1980s. Japan's intent 
for a role beyond a continuing 'economic' emphasis became increasingly 
apparent during this period with Overseas Development Assistance (ODA), 
because of its strategic value, becoming a significant component in Japanese 
involvement. It was the declaration of the Kuranari Doctrine in 1987 that 
made clear Japan's motivation for a greater political role. Thus, from an initial 
focus on economic activities in the South Pacific, strategic and political 
objectives became important considerations for Japan in the growing economic 
relationship. 
The importance of the relationship is borne out by the fact that by the 
beginning of the 1980s, Japan had become a major market for the South Pacific. 
And, if recent investments in the tourist industry are anything to go by, Japan 
holds the potential of becoming the major source of foreign investment for the 
region. Aside from a significant contribution towards multilateral assistance , 
its bilateral ODA has also increased considerably to the point where it is 
displacing such traditional donors as Australia, New Zealand and the United 
Kingdom. 
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For PICs, several factors highlight the importance of Japan's economic 
involvement in their economies. For example, when Japan's aDA is added to 
those of other donors such as Australia, New Zealand and the EEC, the 
collective impact of foreign aid would certainly generate far-reaching 
consequences on the island economies. The fact that 'the people of the South 
Pacific are now the highest recipients of international aid per capita in the 
world'2 seriously undermines the advantages of such aid. The magnitude of the 
impact which could lead to a permanent dependency, is illustrated by the fact 
that between 1977 and 1988, total aDA disbursements to the region increased 
by 85 per cent from $373 million to $698 million. When the French and US 
territories are excluded, aDA commitments actually more than doubled for the 
period from $108 to $244 million. More importantly, many of these island 
economies operate on tiny yearly budgets. For example, government 
expenditure for Tuvalu and Western Samoa in 1982 was only $A3.310 million 
and $A18.485 million respectively. Expenditure for Niue for the 1982-83 
financial year was only $A4.559 million. 3 
The possibility of an entrenchment of the Japanese economic connection 
cannot be ignored and with it the inevitability of some political involvement. 
The wider political implications which derive from this expanding economic 
relationship are many and will undoubtedly have a considerable impact on 
future regional developments. Japanese anxiety for a larger regional role was 
aptly expressed by Foreign Minister Tadashi Kuranari in January of 1987 
when he said that: 
Japan's central foreign policy focus is the promotion of friendly 
and cooperative relations with other countries, particularly with 
neighbouring countries ... Japan will provide as much assistance 
as possible to make the region economically prosperous ... Japan 
will continue to give them the utmost possible cooperation in 
dealing with the great change which they face. 4 
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What is reflected by the declaration of the Kuranari Doctrine was a 
recognition by Japan of the changing 'face' of the South Pacific as new economic 
and political players became more actively involved in the region. It was 
essentially a Japanese response to a changing pattern of interests. 
What is so important about this growing Japanese economic involvement 
in the South Pacific? At the outset, Japan is clearly about to become the major 
actor and influence in the region. It is already a prominent actor in regional 
affairs. With a considerable economic impact already established, it will, in all 
probability, be also the 'most active cultural-political influence in the region 
into the foreseeable future'.5 Second, because the vast majority of PICs see 
economic vulnerability as their biggest security threat6 , Japan, with its 
capacity to provide economic assistance, will continue to be regarded as a 
necessary and alternative source of aid as PICs diversify their sources of aid 
beyond the 'traditional' donors like Australia, New Zealand and the United 
Kingdom. 
Above all, it means that Japan's economic relation with the South Pacific 
IS now one of the most important relationships in the region. More 
importantly, it means that irrespective of how PICs may wish to interact with 
it, Japan has now come to the South Pacific to stay. The certainty of a growing 
Japanese economic involvement was clearly established in January 1987, at the 
declaration of the Kuranari Doctrine which identified Japan as a Pacific nation 
involved in the building of the future Pacific Community. 7 And, as Professor 
Ron Crocombe rightly points out, there is little that Pacific Islanders can do to 
stop this from happening 'except to work towards as deep an understanding 
they [Pacific Islanders] can get of the likely future realities'.8 Essentially, the 
task for PICs is to grasp the meaning of Japan's increased economic power and 
influence in this part of the world, for only if they have some understanding of 
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this phenomenon can they hope to be able to influence some of the 
consequences. 
The primary objective of this study therefore is to examine the structure 
of Japan's economic relations with the South Pacific; to explore the extent of 
Japan's economic involvement; and to determine how far it is motivated by 
economic, political and strategic objectives. In other words, the aim is to 
identify and analyse the underlying forces which have generated Japan's 
growing economic involvement in the South Pacific. 
Chapter I looks specifically at the dimensions of the econonnc 
relationship. The focus here is on the structure and extent of Japanese 
involvement through ODA, trade and investment. This requires an analysis of 
some of the characteristics of each of these categories. The focus of analysis in 
Chapter II is on how Japan has pursued its objectives in the region. What 
strategies have been employed to advance its economic involvement? How 
much involvement is directed by government? To what extent is the private 
sector a player in the strategies employed? How comprehensive are the 
strategies used? Chapter III looks at the motivations and underlying forces 
which gave rise to Japan's growing economic involvement. More specifically, it 
addresses the question of the extent to which Japanese involvement has been 
economically motivated, and how far political and strategic objectives have 
shaped this economic behaviour. 
The thrust of the main argument presented in this study is that Japan's 
economic involvement in the South Pacific was advanced initially by its 
perceived national economic interests. In recent years, however, its 
preoccupation with developing the economic dimension of the relationship has 
incorporated and given way to new strategic and political realities in the 
region. Thus the basis of the relationship today can no longer be explained by 
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Japanese economic interests only. Rather, it is to be explained by Japanese 
political and strategic objectives, as well as by economic interests. This, 
however, is not to suggest a decline in Japan's economic interests. On the 
contrary, Japanese economic and commercial interests will undoubtedly remain 
a central motive for Japanese involvement in the South Pacific. 
Endnotes 
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6 
Chapter I 
THE ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP 
First contact between Japan and the Pacific islands began just prior to the turn 
of the century. These were irregular and restricted to Melanesia and the small 
scattered islands of Micronesia In Melanesia, by 1891, relations had been 
established through the use of Japanese immigrant labourers in the nickel 
mines of New Caledonia. The Japanese government had also considered the 
establishment of an agricultural colony in the New Hebrides (Vanuatu today). 
During this same period, initiatives were also taken by several private 
Japanese companies to develop commercial interests and sugar plantations in 
Micronesia. 1 Initial contacts were thus motivated largely by a strong sense of 
adventure, and pioneering spirit, and some commercial interests, which 
ultimately culminated, some decades later, in a desire for a 'southward 
advance'.2 The relationships which emanated from these early contacts 
between Japan and the Pacific islands developed gradually from irregular 
contacts to the establishment of some limited trade initiated by entrepreneurs 
Taguchi Ukichi and Komida Kigi in Ponape in 1890, and Mitzutani Shimnu on 
Truk in 1891.3 These Japanese initiatives soon developed after some initial 
organisational and financial difficulties. And although Japanese commercial 
interests were briefly checked by the outbreak of the First World War (1914-
1918) they were resumed soonafter. These first economic relations were 
irregular and contrasted quite markedly from the long-term comprehensive 
linkages which have characterised the economic involvement in the South 
Pacific of the contemporary 'global-looking' Japan. 
Japan's 'official' presence in the region did not eventuate until 1921 
when, by order of the League of Nations, it was granted mandate over the 
former German islands of Palau, Saipan, Yap, Truk, Ponape and the Marshall 
Islands.4 Except for Nauru and the Gilbert Islands (Kiribati today), which was 
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then administered by Britain, Japan administered Micronesia until the end of 
World War II in 1945. Elsewhere in the region, the various islands remained 
within the sphere of 'western' influence under the colonial administrations of 
Britain, the United States, France, Australia, New Zealand and for different 
periods of time, of Germany, the Netherlands and Indonesia. 5 
The kinds of economic relationship established by Japan as the 
administering power over Micronesia, provide a useful insight into the 
distinctive economic approach to the South Pacific adopted by Japan. And, as 
we shall see in Chapter II, many of these features persist today. Above all else, 
the ultimate motive for generating economic relations was to meet the demands 
of the Japanese market and, essentially, to advance national Japanese 
economic and commercial interests. This was shown by the activities in 
Micronesia of the South Seas Trading Company, the South Seas Development 
Company and the Wan'yo Takushoku Kaisha which produced copra, sugar and 
phosphate respectively: 'all three firms, even the two founded by private 
capital, tended to shape their economic activities to the overall priorities of the 
colonial government'.6 Another characteristic feature of Japanese 
administration was the close working relationship that existed between 
government and the private sector. As Mark Peattie notes: 
the subsequent economic development of Micronesia under the 
Japanese represents an interplay of private initiative and 
government capital, a combination that had first been successful 
in the homeland and had been replayed in each of Japan's colonial 
terri tories. 7 
After Japan's forced withdrawal from Micronesia in 1945, it did not again 
involve itself in the Pacific islands until the early 1960s. This time, the 
involvement was with islands south of the equator but following the same 
pattern. Relations were established first through trade and investments 
followed soon after. By the late 1970s, ODA had become an important 
component of Japanese involvement. 
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This chapter looks specifically at the 'economic' dimension of the 
relationship. It examines the nature and extent of Japanese involvement 
through ODA, trade and investment and highlights the growing importance of 
the expanding economic relationship. 
Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) 
Japan's bilateral ODA to the region in recent years has been a consistent 
allocation of about 1 per cent of her total bilateral ODA.8 On a world scale, 
such a small percentage allocation seems insignificant. In real terms however, 
the contribution towards the economies ofPICs is very significant, as borne out 
by the fact that Japan today is the largest donor for several of the independent 
island states outside Papua New Guinea. That amount increased rapidly over 
the last decade. In 1979, Japan contributed only $13.6 million to the region. 
Ten years later, the figure had jumped to $93.07 million. The growing 
importance of Japanese aid to the South Pacific becomes obvious when it is 
compared to those of other donors. In 1976, Japan's bilateral ODA to all SPF 
countries, other than PNG and Nauru (i.e. Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Niue, 
Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and Western Samoa) stood at 
$0.8 million compared to Australia's $8.7 million, New Zealand's $17.6 million 
and the UK with $42.9 million. By 1986 however, Japan's commitment had 
risen to $16.1 million, an increase of more than 1,600 per cent over the ten year 
period. By comparison, Australia's total was $34.5 million, an increase of just 
over 400 per cent; New Zealand's total increased by 7 per cent to $23.2 million, 
with the UK showing a decline of over 100 per cent to $20.2 million.9 It should, 
however, be noted that Australia's contribution is much larger when PNG is 
included. Canberra's 'special' relationship with her former colony has meant 
that since 1975 approximately 85 per cent of Australia's ODA is channelled to 
Port Moresby. For example, in the 1989-90 year, Australia granted about 
9 
$300 million to PNG, with another $85 million being targeted for other Pacific 
Islands. 10 
The growing importance of Japan's bilateral ODA is noticeable when it is 
taken on a country by country basis. As these examples show, even by 1986 
Japan had become a significant donor. Japan's commitment of $10.98 million 
to Fiji in 1986 consisted of 33.9 per cent of Fiji's total bilateral aid making it a 
donor second only to Australia; Kiribati's $4.31 million was 36.2 per cent 
putting Japan ahead of the UK; Tonga's $3.57 million comprised 30.9 per cent 
making Japan second to Australia; and Western Samoa's $9.16 million 
comprised 50.7 per cent, making Japan clearly the largest donor.ll 
The structure of Japanese ODA is worthy of note. At the most basic 
level, Japan's ODA consists of Grant Capital Assistance (or grant aid), ODA 
Loans and Technical Cooperation. The three categories are defined as follows: 
Grant Aid is funds provided to developing countries without 
imposing repayment obligations on recipient countries ... includes 
the provision of financial resources ... for the procurement of 
equipment, facilities, materials and services necessary for their 
economic and social development programs. 
ODA Loans constitute a large part of 'loan aid' which provides 
funds on the premise that its principal will be repaid with interest 
[usually at a low interest rate]. 
Technical Cooperation is an activity which teaches and transfers 
technologies, skills, and knowledge which are important for the 
development of human resources ... involves dispatching experts, 
accepting trainees and students ... 12 
Of the above three mentioned categories, Japan's ODA commitments to 
the South Pacific have focussed mainly in the area of grant aid, administered 
on a bilateral or multilateral basis through multilateral agencies such as the 
ADB, the World Bank and UNDP. In 1985 for example, more than 90 per cent 
of the aid received from Japan consisted of grant aid. 13 Assistance through 
technical cooperation has also been important, so much so that by 1988 it rated 
a high second after grant aid. on the other hand, ODA loans have not been 
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used extensively. In 1988 only Papua New Guinea and to a lesser extent the 
Solomon Islands received substantial loans. However, the future possibility of 
loans being extended to other relatively 'resource-rich' economies like Vanuatu 
and Fiji, cannot be dismissed. 
In terms of Japan's grant aid to the region, several observations can be 
made. Firstly, the high component of the grant element is in marked contrast 
to Japan's aid to Asian countries, where 'ODA loans are the main form of 
Japanese aid'.14 This can be explained by the fact that Japan is currently 
giving much more serious consideration to qualitative improvements in ODA by 
increasing grant aid. There is another factor. The idea that 'grants should be 
the principal form of aid is now the basic trend internationally'.15 Scarcity of 
natural resources throughout the region also restricts the possibilities for 
'trading' rather than 'donor-recipient' relationships. As well, by focussing on 
grant assistance, it is probably another way for Japan to keep in line with the 
type of aid given by the 'traditional' donors-Australia and New Zealand. 16 
Such an action serves to minimise the possibility for conflict with Canberra and 
Wellington, as Japan strives to advance its own economic and political agenda 
in the South Pacific. The types of projects sponsored by Japan through grant 
aid, as these projects for Western Samoa in 1979-82 show, extend over a wide 
range of areas including income-generating projects in such areas as 
agriculture and fishing, health and education, and large infrastructure projects. 
The likelihood of grant aid remaining a major component of Japan's aid 
package to the South Pacific is reflected by the growing importance given to the 
grant element in Japan's aid package. This factor has been acknowledged by 
some of Japan's most influential economists including Akio Watanabe, Yasuaki 
Takahashi, Isami Takeda and Isumi Kobayashi. 17 Kobayashi has stated that 
priority will be given to grant aid rather than loans in Japan's assistance to 
Pacific islands countries for the immediate future 18, but Watanabe also 
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suggests that, while grant aid is most appropriate, assistance should also 
'emphasise medical care and cultural activities such as education, 
entertainment and sports'.19 The provision of funding for educational 
development is instructive and, in my view, reflects a Japanese recognition of 
the importance of cultural development as a 'facilitator' for enhancing a more 
sympathetic understanding of Japan's broader involvement in the region. 
Japan also recognises technical assistance as an important contributing 
factor for enhancing its relations with PIC's. Towards this end, Tokyo has, 
since the early 1970s, provided funding for the training of trainees in 'home' 
countries and in Japan, despatched experts, survey teams and equipment 
overseas and sent JOCV s to the region. The extent to which technical 
cooperation has been emphasised is significant considering the relatively small 
size of the region with a population of less than five million. For example in 
1988, Japan funded the training of 268 Pacific Islanders (which was 3.4 per 
cent of Japan's total number of trainees for the year), visits by 246 survey 
personnel (3.6 per cent) and 266 JOCVs (10.2 per cent). Incidentally, the 
number of JOCV s funded exceeded that of 194 (7.46 per cent) for the whole 
Middle East region.20 But while Japan has certainly made a strong effort in 
recent years to expand the proportion of technical aid at the global level, 
technical assistance consisted of only 14.5 per cent of Japan's total ODA in 
1985, a percentage well below the DAC average of 20.8 per cent.21 
In the South Pacific, the growing emphasis on technical aid, can be seen 
in the use of JOCV s in eight of the microstates.22 Only five volunteers were 
despatched when JOCV s were first sent in 1972; four to Western Samoa and 
one to Vanuatu. In 1988, a total of 103 JOCV s were actively employed by 
Pacific island governments in areas such as Fisheries, Agriculture and 
Forestry, Communication, Transport and Public Welfare. These volunteers 
were concentrated in the larger economies of PNG (26), Fiji (22), Tonga (16), 
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Solomon Islands (13) and Western Samoa (13). It should also be noted that 
since 1972 PNG and Western Samoa have received a total of 134 and 181 
volunteers respectively, making them the largest recipients of JOCV S.23 
How and where JOCVs are employed provides yet another dimension to 
Japan's aid package. These examples are for Western Samoa. In 1988, 
volunteers consisted of consultants and surveyors, specialists in stock control, 
systems programming, soil testing, forestry and vegetable growing, experts in 
marine engineering, outboard motor mechanics and so the list goes on.24 Beside 
JOCVs, numerous other skilled personnel were provided through aid schemes 
from Australia and New Zealand, the US Peace Corps and UNVs which all 
accounted for the heavy expenditure of $4,787,600 in Western Samoa's general 
development sector in 1988.25 
Two observations can be made about the increased use of JOCV s in the 
region. First, Japan recognises the value derived from its volunteers being seen 
actively working alongside volunteers from 'traditional' donor countries. 
Second, Tokyo sees some advantages in the use of its volunteers to enhance an 
image of Japanese practicability especially in economies such as PNG where 
there is still a tremendous potential for exploiting the economic resources. 
The tied or 'collaborative' nature in which Japanese grant and technical 
aid has functioned is also worthy of note. Thus, it was not unusual that, when 
a grant for development projects was made to Western Samoa's Department of 
Agriculture, Forests and Fisheries in 1988, Japan also provided the expertise 
for these projects: specialists in vegetable growing, outboard motor mechanics 
and fishing gear and methods. 26 For Japan, survey teams play an important 
role in ensuring that aid is 'tied'. It is this aspect of Japan's aid programme 
which has been often criticised. Alan Rix notes the problem as one of bias 
which is designed to maximise Japanese input: 
Herein lies a serious bias in the technical programme towards its 
use as a preliminary stage to development financing of projects, 
thus effectively tying projects through links established between 
[Japanese] survey contractors and loan tenders.27 
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Technical assistance administered through JICA is now considered a 
high priority because it emphasises the development of human resources in 
recipient countries. Japan values technical cooperation because it is conducted 
at the personal contact level. Mindful of the need to build goodwill and 
understanding among PICs, many of whom suffered atrocities under Japanese 
occupation during World War II, Japan has emphasised JICA because of the 
'people to people' contact by volunteers working in the field. Thus, Japan takes 
maximum advantage of the positive influence technical aid and involvement 
has on enhancing 'mutual' understanding between the peoples of Japan and the 
developing countries.28 Technical cooperation will continue to play an 
important role in the. As of 1986, there is a representative in Fiji and two 
offices of JICA have already been established in Apia and Port Moresby. The 
announcement in February this year that forty Japanese nurses under the 
JOCVs are to be employed in the Solomon Islands29 , and that Japan will 
provide funding and specialists for a School of Japanese Culture and Language, 
as part of the Solomon Islands College of Higher Education, bear witness to this 
policy30, as does the proposal to encourage student exchange and the 
establishment of a School of Information Sciences and a Centre for Japanese 
Language Studies in Fiji. 
While Japan has favoured technical assistance in the majority of the 
microstates up to 1988, only PNG and to a much lesser extent, the Solomon 
Islands have received substantial loans from Tokyo. For PNG, the percentage 
share of loan assistance has remained at a fairly constant level. In 1983, Port 
Moresby received grants (i.e. grant aid and technical cooperation) to the value 
of $1.14 million; $2.37 million was received as loan aid. Five years later, grant 
aid totalled $5.38 million; loan aid was $12.27 million.31 Present indications 
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however, show that the percentage share of loan aid in Japan's total bilateral 
ODA to the region will increase. There is every possibility of this happening, 
especially in PNG, the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and Fiji because of their 
natural resources. And while loans to PNG until recently have been directed 
mainly to social and economic infrastructural developments such as water and 
sewerage projects mainly for domestic use32, there is now every likelihood of 
Japanese loan aid and investments being expanded in other sectors and on a 
much larger scale. This shift reflects the fact that PNG is richly endowed with 
timber, marine and mineral resources such as 'copper, coal and silver deposits 
which are known to be substantial. Oil is also believed to be under the 
immediately adjacent seas' and was recently discovered in the central 
highlands. 33 A recent report quoted the Lihir Island gold deposit as having the 
potential of becoming the world's largest outside South Mrica. 34 Japan's 
economy needs these raw materials, hence Tokyo has a strong interest in 
gaining a share of these resources when they are ready for exploitation. Prime 
Minister Nakasone's 1985 promise of aid for the construction of the huge multi-
million dollar trans-island highway that would link Port Moresby and Lae35 
suggests a firm Japanese commitment to long-term involvement in the PNG 
economy. It also reflects the strong possibility that Tokyo will use loans and 
investments more extensively, as the preferred means to exploit these resources 
(as it had done in South East Asia) as well as for securing trade relations with 
the microstates.36 
This is not to suggest that economic relations between Tokyo and Port 
Moresby have been initiated and conducted entirely for Japanese self-interest, 
but rather that an interdependent relationship has been forged. The rationale 
of the relationships is described by Goodman and Moos in these words: 
Japanese and Papua New Guinea economic relations are likely to 
increase in volume, for Japan needs Papua New Guinea's natural 
resource products, and Papua New Guinea needs Japanese help in 
extracting these products and selling them abroad. 37 
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By the same token however, it should be noted that the relationship as it is 
explained below, is asymmetrical and is certainly not one of equal exchange. 
Trade Relations 
South Pacific trade relations with Japan date back to the early 1960s. Initial 
participation involved trading manufactured goods for raw materials such as 
nickel from New Caledonia and phosphate from French Polynesia. Investments 
during those early years were relatively small compared to those in the 1980s. 
That Japan would ultimately become a prominent actor in regional trade was 
already anticipated in the February issue of PIM in 1963. 
In the past few years Japanese commercial interests have been 
moving unobtrusively into the area ... Direct Japanese enterprise 
... have also participated in mining in New Caledonia and Fiji and 
have looked at manganese possibilities in Papua New Guinea. 
They have a growing stake in the Pacific timber industry ... are 
still French Polynesia's biggest customer for Makatea phosphate. 
But it is in trading and particularly in selling manufactured goods 
to the Pacific that they are changing the whole of islands 
marketing and look already to be in a fair way to ousting other 
countries [UK, Australia and New Zealand] which have for 
generations looked upon the area as their traditional preserve. 
Already, Japan has the market for transistor radios, cameras ... 
and is whittling away into items ... Japanese capital and 
enterprise is now found in almost every island group south of the 
equator.38 
The PIM correspondent then goes on to suggest that: 
if this trend continues and there seems nothing to stop it-Japan 
must inevitably playa larger and larger part in the affairs of the 
Pacific.39 
The validity of these observations, made almost three decades ago, is 
borne out by substantial evidence. Today, Japanese economic participation in 
the South Pacific is comprehensive. Trade, followed by investment and 
increased bilateral and multilateral ODA, has diversified Japanese economic 
involvement. The volume of trade with the region has expanded, especially 
since the late 1970s and early 1980s. As a result, Japan has gained a much 
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bigger share of the Pacific market than previously, thereby posing a direct 
challenge to the predominance since the beginning of this century of 
'traditional' traders like Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. This 
trend however, does not suggest a Japanese dominance of trade in 1990 
(although this could happen by the end of the decade), but rather points to the 
unmistakeable rise of Japan as a major trading partner. 
The volume of trade between Japan and the region had already gained 
prominence by the mid-1970s. Total imports from Japan in 1977 were valued 
at $A104 million making her the fifth largest supplier after Australia, US, New 
Zealand and France. On the other hand, exports from the region to Japan in 
1977 were valued at $A235 million which made her the largest export market 
for the South Pacific.40 In fact, Japan, along with Europe and the US, provided 
the main export markets for PICs. In 1980, Japan remained the biggest export 
market for PICs taking 26.1 per cent share of total exports from the region. 
This position was maintained until about 1983. Japan has since fallen to a 
close second behind Europe; a Europe which also has every possibility of 
becoming the future dominant market especially with the impending 'merger' 
in 1992 of a united Europe.41 In 1984, Europe received exports from the South 
Pacific valued at $A407 million against Japan's $A402 million; in 1985 it was 
$A580 million against $A450 million; and in 1986 the figures were 
$A684 million against $A516 million.42 Despite being overtaken by Europe in 
1990, Japan remains a major and influential market. Her rating among the 
three biggest trading nations during the last decade is likely to remain intact, 
thus ensuring a prominent economic role for Japan in future regional 
developments. 
On the other hand, Australia maintained her position as the largest 
supplier of imports for the region in 1980 in terms of total value, taking a 
26 per cent share of the market followed by France (13.9 per cent), Japan 
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(11.7 per cent), US (11 per cent) and New Zealand (8.0 per cent).43 The total 
volume of trade with Japan in 1980, was valued at $A757.739 million putting 
Japan second only to Australia with $A854.994 million as the largest trading 
nation. Within the region as a whole, however, the trade flow between Japan 
and the region is relatively small; it is only about 50 per cent of the total trade 
between Japan and New Zealand, which amounted to $1,504.6 million in 
1980.44 This increasing involvement is illustrated in Japan's trade with PNG. 
Before 1960, the volume of trade was negligible and yet, less than two decades 
later, Japan had become PNG's second largest market after Australia. In fact, 
by 1978, Japan was PNG's largest supplier of several manufactures such as 
machinery, transport, electronics and engineering equipment. In turn, PNG 
exports to Japan comprised fish, timber, coffee and most notably, copper ore 
which consisted of seven-eights (7/8) of PNG's $A230 million worth of exports in 
1977.45 
The importance of trade relations between Japan and the South Pacific 
stems from the fact that PNG, along with Fiji, make up two of the region's 
largest economies. Along with Japanese ODA and investm,ents, good trade 
relations with these leading countries serve to ensure Japan will play an 
influential role in the region in future. In 1980, PNG accounted for 
$A160 million and Fiji for $A 70 million of a total of $A299 million worth of 
imports from Japan; a combined total of $A230 million or more than 75 per cent 
of the region's imports. In exports to Japan, a growth rate of 27 per cent over 
1979 was recorded for which PNG accounted for $A314 million or 68 per cent of 
the region's total of $A460 million in exports. Fiji, with sugar being the main 
commodity, accounted for $A33 million. New Caledonia was the other major 
significant exporter with $A93 million worth in exports, mainly in nicke1. 46 The 
rest of the microstates combined accounted for the remaining $A20 million of 
exports. 
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In terms of trade with the Forum microstates, only one country, 
Australia, was ahead of J apan.47 Yet, the possibility of competition from other 
major traders cannot be ignored, with the EEC being a case in point. By and 
large, Australia's predominance has prevailed by virtue of its size and economic 
power, its historical links and close proximity to most of the island states 
particularly PNG, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and even Fiji and Tonga. The 
same argument could be made for New Zealand which trades mainly with 
Western Samoa, Cook Islands and Niue. Australia's continuing dominance, 
when compared to Japan's trade with the Forum island states only, is shown by 
an examination of trade conducted with PNG and Fiji. The volume of trade 
between PNG and Australia in 1986 was $K507.466 million compared to that 
with Japan of $K423.989 million. Between Fiji and Australia, it was 
$F221.106 million against $F80.725 million with Japan.48 
But while trade in dollar terms has certainly expanded between Japan 
and the South Pacific, a trade imbalance in favour of Japan has remained. 
Except for PNG and the Solomon Islands (which trade mainly in timber, 
minerals and fish), imports from Japan between 1982 and 1988 far exceeded 
exports from the region. The imbalance is very marked in trade wi th Western 
Samoa, Vanuatu, Kiribati and Tuvalu; and even much more so with Guam and 
American Samoa.49 For example, imports from Japan to Western Samoa over 
the seven-year period exceeded exports by $31 million (i.e. $40 million imports 
against $9 million exports). In Vanuatu imports exceeded exports by 
$69 million ($87 million against $9 million). For Fiji the trade imbalance in 
1984 was sharp. Against imports from Japan which consisted mainly of 
manufactured goods for its tourist industry and valued at F$158 million, Fiji 
exported only $3 million worth of goods. Unfortunately, for the majority of 
microstates, this trade imbalance is unlikely to improve. Their paucity in 
natural resources, their lack of trained manpower, their small but rapidly 
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nSlng populations, 'a limited revenue base, geographic remoteness and 
fragmentation, limited telecommunications and high transport costs .. .' make it 
SO.50 
Foreign Investment 
Foreign investments during the last three decades have risen markedly, with 
Japanese investment playing an increasingly prominent role in several sectors. 
This section surveys the extent of involvement and the areas in which foreign 
investment, and in particular Japanese investment, IS concentrated. 
Investment in the tourist industry is discussed in some detail as a case study. 
The involvement of foreign investment and enterprises in the South 
Pacific, which were mainly of Australian, New Zealand, British, French and 
German origin, dates back to the latter part of the last century. These long-
standing colonial ties explain much of the early structure of foreign investment. 
Until 1945, investment was concentrated mainly in the plantation and trading 
sectors, in transportation and in the mining industry. However, new trends 
have gradually emerged. In PNG and Fiji where Australian investment has 
predominated, old companies have diversified their interests and invested in 
new areas. In Fiji the move by Bums Philp into food processing and 
manufacturing and British Petroleum's involvement with the Pine Commission 
are two examples. 51 In some ways the trend towards diversification was 
enhanced by the advent of other 'new' foreign-based companies from 'new' 
investment partners such as Japan, Korea and the US. Such foreign 
investment has consistently favoured the resource-rich economies of PNG, Fiji, 
Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands which hold the best prospects for profit. 52 
Investment in PNG has been associated with petroleum and minerals 
exploration and extraction and forestry; in Fiji, with forestry and fishing and 
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since about 1987 with tourism on a big scale; in the Solomon Islands the bulk of 
the investments are in timber processing, mineral exploration and fisheries. 
Indications show that foreign investment will continue to playa vital role in the 
island economies because it provides much-needed capital and foreign 
exchange . It also 
brings technical knowledge and managerial know-how which are 
critically scarce throughout the region. [As well] foreign 
enterprises serve as a vehicle for passing skills and knowledge to 
local workers through training and on the job learning. 53 
This is certainly true of mining, timber processing, fisheries development and 
tourism. However, from a Pacific perspective, of even greater importance are 
the employment opportunities provided by these mainly labour-intensive 
industries. For example, the Denarau Resort project in Fiji is expected to have 
a permanent staff of five thousand when completed. One estimate claims that 
for every tourist, three jobs are created directly and six jobs indirectly.54 Above 
all, foreign enterprises facilitate access to a wider range of markets and 
strengthen the capacity to withstand external pressures. This is important in 
the extremely competitive world market today. When, for example, the US 
imposed a trade-ban on Solomons-Taiyo canned fish as retaliation for the arrest 
of the 'Jeanette Diana' in 1984, Taiyo executives in Tokyo were able to use 'its 
world-wide marketing network to find buyers for the fish in Thailand'. 55 
The involvement of foreign investment is extensive when one considers 
the relatively small size of the microstate economies. In PNG, the stock of 
foreign investment in 1978 was estimated at $860 million; for Fiji it was 
$220 million with an estimate of $40 million for Vanuatu. 56 What percentage 
share of these stocks were of Japanese origin is difficult to discern, suffice it to 
say that Japanese investment was involved, though certainly not to the same 
extent as Australian investment. Certainly Japan's flows of financial resources 
to developing countries increased significantly during the last two decades. 
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Figures show that private flows had increased from $669 million in 1970 to a 
massive $12.822 billion in 1988 which exceeded $9.134 billion ODA for the 
same year.57 In fact, Japanese direct capital investment amounting to 
$2.25 million had already been invested in PNG in 1974; only a year later it 
was $8.2 million.58 And while PNG has attracted the bulk of Japanese 
investment, it is also found in Fiji, Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands. In the 
Solomon Islands, it occurs in the timber industry and in a joint fishing venture 
between government and a Japanese company. Established in 1973, Solomons-
Taiyo Ltd. has made fisheries the largest export-earner averaging about 
$20 million or one-third (1/3) of the total value of the Solomon's exports per year, 
ahead of timber and copra. 59 Joint ventures such as this and the Fiji 
government's participation with C. Itoh Ltd. in a fishing venture, are favoured 
by several PICs for they also allow for more effective local participation. Today, 
Japanese investment is found in virtually all of the microstates. 
Nowhere is the trend of growth more clearly demonstrated than in the 
tourist industry. Despite many severe interruptions, such as the perennial 
havoc caused by frequent cyclones and the aftermath of two coups in Fiji in 
1987, the tourist industry in that country has maintained a trend of steady 
growth. However, the advent of Japanese corporate interests and the massive 
injection of capital since about 1987, have suddenly projected tourism into a 
position of far greater prominence than previously, as a major source for 
expanding foreign trade. For Japanese investors, tourism offers the potential of 
becoming 'the' major growth industry with a multi-billion dollar turnover. 
Japanese companies have invested in real estate, purchased hotels and resorts , 
and sought shareholdings in airlines servicing the South Pacific. There can be 
no doubt about the seriousness of Japanese intentions. In less than five years , 
investments in tourist-related developments around the South Pacific and the 
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wider Asia-Pacific nm by one Japanese company alone have exceeded $7 
billion. 
In Fiji, Electronic and Industrial Enterprises (EIE) is spending $275-
300 million on the Denarau Island Resort, which is believed to be the largest 
private resort development in the South Pacific and will have, when completed, 
a permanent workforce of about 5,000.60 The resort will raise Fiji's first class 
accommodation from 4,300 to 11,300 rooms.6! EIE has also invested in several 
other Fijian resorts, and other Japanese companies are entering the tourist 
industry; for example, South Pacific Development Ltd., have purchased the 
Pacific Harbour Resort for $80 million. One of Fiji's largest freehold islands is 
also the property of a Japanese millionaire.62 
In the Solomon Islands, the Honiara government sold 80 per cent of its 
shares in the Solomon's largest hotel Mendana to a Japanese consortium 
Kitano Ltd.63 In Vanuatu, another consortium Tokyu Corporation, bought 
Vanuatu's largest hotel Lagon for $30 million64 , while other Japanese investors 
purchased 140 residential and commercial properties in Vila, as well as coconut 
and cattle plantations in Esperitu Santo.65 Japanese investment has moved 
elsewhere in the region. So far, EIE investments in French Polynesia amount 
to $78.5 million for the purchase of three hotels and $51 million for a two-phase 
development plan.66 Last year in New Caledonia, EIE obtained an initial 
investment of $8 million for a hotel and resort complex.67 However, this 
massive injection of capital in tourism cannot be appreciated without 
recognising it as an extension of similar Japanese involvement in the Pacific 
rim, Southern California, Manila, Hawaii, Guam, Saipan, Australia and New 
Zealand; where, needless to say, Japanese investment has increased and 
'shows every sign of growing far larger in the 90S'.68 
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The extent of the increase in Japanese investments in these countries 
bordering or just outside the PICs is considerable. Often they are linked. For 
example, aside from its vast investments in Fiji, EIE's investment in tourist 
and resort developments in Australia in 1988 alone was estimated at 
$1.6 billion. EIE is also a major shareholder in Bond University.69 In Australia 
the growth in Japanese investment, particularly in real estate and property, 
has been dramatic. Of all 'new' proposals by foreign investors since 1985, 
Japanese investment which rose from $1.9 billion in 1985-86 to $9.1 billion in 
1988-89, exceeded them all. In fact, as of June 1989, the total Japanese 
investment (direct and indirect) of $32 billion in Australia rated third after the 
UK and the US which invested $55 billion and $48 billion respectively. 70 A 
similar trend in property investment also occurred in New Zealand where the 
Japanese made up 25 per cent of the foreign buyers in the sale of 87 farms and 
resort properties approved by the New Zealand Overseas Investment 
Commission in 1989.71 Hawaii and Guam, with their history of Japanese 
investment, have also experienced a resurgence of Japanese interest in 
tourism.72 
For PICs, what is also significant about Japanese investments on these 
'bordering' countries is that these countries will serve as bases or stepping 
stones for furthering Japanese economic interests in the region. Hawaii is 
already serving that purpose. In the case of Australia and New Zealand, their 
historical links with the South Pacific, and that of France through French 
Polynesia and New Caledonia provide added advantage to their being used by 
Japanese companies as doorways to the region. 
The Japanese are very optimistic about the growth potential of the 
tourist industry and are clearly moving in to become a major and long-term 
actor in regional economic developments. Dr Bungo Ishizaki, chief adviser of 
EIE, now Fiji's biggest single foreign investor and also reported to be 
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Australia's largest property-owner73, recogruses the potential of tourism ill 
these terms: 
The scope and potential for tourism is enormous. It also serves as 
a precursor for further developments in other sectors. I believe 
tourism will be the single largest industry in the Pacific bar none 
... We have both the source and destination markets in the one 
region ... Our interests in the region are quite extensive and are all 
in the long-term or infrastructure category. 74 
Japanese attempts to buy shareholdings in airlines servicing the South 
Pacific have also been considerable. Today, EIE has a 10 per cent shareholding 
in Fiji's national airline Air Pacific. In turn, Air Pacific now owns a 50 per cent 
share of Air Terminal Services, the company which operates ground handling 
services at N adi International Airport. 75 While it was unsuccessful in its bid to 
buy a 10 per cent share in Air New Zealand in 1988, EIE recently sought a 
25 per cent share in Tonga's national airline Friendly Islands Airways as well 
as an investment in a major resort in Tonga.76 In New Caledonia, EIE has 
obtained a 15 per cent shareholding in Air Caledonia while elsewhere in the 
region EIE has sought shares in Qantas, Air Vanuatu and Air Tahiti. 77 
What can be concluded from EIE's attempt to buy shareholdings In 
regional airlines is a desire to obtain a degree of control to ensure that tourists 
are directed to its resorts scattered around the region. EIE's interests are still 
expanding. Its projected involvement in tourist related developments in 1988 
was estimated at more than $7 billion.78 Yet, while EIE and other Japanese 
investments to-date are certainly enormous by Pacific Island standards, it is 
well to remember that 
these investments, made predominantly by individuals or 
corp orates are minute [compared] to those possible by Japanese 
institutional investors ... who have massive funds at their disposal . 
The real Japanese investor is yet to come.79 
What has been established in the preceding discussion on the economic 
relationship between Japan and the South Pacific is that the relationship is 
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extensive. Today, it is firmly established with expanding trade and investment 
indicators, and increased ODA, clearly pointing to a future of growing Japanese 
economic presence. In the next chapter, we look at how Japan has gone about 
promoting its economic involvement in the region. 
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Chapter II 
STRATEGY FOR ADVANCING JAPANESE ECONOMIC 
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In the previous chapter, it was argued that Japan's economic relationship with 
the South Pacific was essentially a means for advancing its perceived national 
economic interests. However, since the late 1970s, that initial focus and 
preoccupation with economic and commercial relations had been transformed 
by an increased emphasis and incorporation of Japanese political and strategic 
interests. Of course there are critics who would argue that the region is really 
of no political or strategic significance to Japan, and it does not have much 
economic importance either.1 Despite such criticisms, there is much evidence 
which supports the 'transformation' argument as the following strategies 
employed by the Japanese demonstrate. 
Indeed, the advancement of Japan's economic engagement in the South Pacific 
has been characterised by a very determined and even aggressive effort both 
economically and politically. Many strategies have been used. Particularly 
during the last two decades, Japan has practised a global strategy 'to 
increasingly assume a greater political role based on its economic and 
technological strength'.2 Towards this end Japan has, through its recognition of 
the strategic importance of increased ODA, used extremely sophisticated 
diplomacy, shrewd manipulation and sometimes even employed devious means 
to advance its economic and wider strategic interests. When examining the 
nature of Japan's multi-dimensional strategy, in relation to the South Pacific it 
should be borne in mind that the methods employed have always been 
interrelated. 
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Diplomatic Initiatives 
Japan's economic involvement in the South Pacific was enhanced by its effort to 
establish diplomatic relations in the decades since 1962 when many Pacific 
island colonies gained their independence. 3 Diplomatic initiatives were 
important as a strategy for Japan during the early part of this period. Other 
initiatives beyond the diplomatic level were also taken. In the commercial 
sphere for example, a Tokyo fishing company C. Itoh & Co. Ltd., was 
established in Fiji by the early 1960s4 , while Japan had started to send 
volunteers to Tonga by 1974 as part of aid through technical cooperation. 5 In 
most instances, diplomatic relations were established soon after a country won 
its independence. This occurred with Tonga in 1970, Papua New Guinea in 
1975 and Vanuatu in 1980. Where an embassy could not be created 
immediately, a Japanese ambassador resident in an established host country 
like Australia, was usually credited with the additional responsibility. Fiji is a 
case in point. Although diplomatic relations were confirmed soon after Fiji's 
independence in 1970, it was not until 1979 that an embassy was established in 
Suva. In turn, Fiji established an embassy in Tokyo in 1981.6 
For Japan, immediate recognition of independence served as a useful 
exercise in public relations, especially during the early years of post-colonial 
independence. As well, it served as a base upon which to build and extend 
future Japanese economic involvement throughout the region. Japan's 
diplomatic initiatives have expanded in recent years and her desire for a more 
active role in the South Pacific was highlighted by the visit to Fiji and Papua 
New Guinea in 1985 of Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone and Foreign 
Minister Shintaro Abe.7 This was the first-ever visit to the South Pacific by a 
Japanese Prime Minister. Foreign Minister Tadashi Kuranari's follow-up visit 
in January 1987 further demonstrated Japan's intention of raising its political 
profile in the region. Of particular significance was the declaration of the 
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'Kuranari Doctrine's which specifically outlined Japan's policy designs for the 
South Pacific. The underlying forces which gave rise to the doctrine are 
discussed in Chapter III. 
What is important about these diplomatic initiatives is the implication 
that Japanese private business interests were being incorporated into 
government policy. The question arises whether the Japanese government, 
through elected representatives, functions independent of, or in collaboration 
with industrialists and executives of large business interests, in executing its 
domestic and foreign policies. Most of the available evidence suggests that 
collaboration between the state and private business is normal practice. 
Indeed, it is often argued that Japan's rise as a global economic power 
originates from the use of a 'state guided market system [whereby] the state's 
role in the economy is shared with the private sector and [the fact that] both 
private and public sectors have perfected means to make the market work for 
developmental goals'.9 This strategy acquires its strength from a partnership 
between central government bureaucrats and entrepreneurs. As Vogel has 
noted, rather than strovomg tp gain control over non-government corporations 
'government officials consider one of their basic tasks to be guiding and 
encouraging industries that they expect to become increasingly competitive 
internationally'. 10 Thus bureaucrats serve to guide the national economy 1n 
collaboration with the business community at home and abroad. 
This unique relationship has enabled Japan to be single-minded in the 
pursuit of its national aims and policies. The Japanese Government sees the 
promotion of the national economy as its first priority while business interests 
enjoy a comparative advantage over foreign companies in terms of such matters 
as lobbying and regulatory compliance. ll The effectiveness with which this 
approach has been adopted is reflected in the majority of initiatives advanced 
by Japan at home and around the globe. One characteristic example of this 
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approach at work occurs in fisheries, where fishing companies in Tokyo have 
been instrumental in urging the government to increase its ODA, supposedly 
'as bait to secure agreements favourable to the Japanese fishing industry ... 
[and as] a means for obtaining fishing rights in waters of foreign countries. 12 
The strategy is most effective when implemented within a framework of 
sophisticated diplomacy enhanced by cultural exchange and political 
manoeuvres. 
In terms of the government working closely with the private sector, a 
Japanese scholar notes how ODA flows and private investment have become 
more concurrent than previously.13 A recent proposal for the kinds of 
assistance to be offered to PICs even suggests that policies should be formed so 
that Japan's ODA will help make it attractive for private Japanese companies 
to move into the area in the future. 14 One example of this approach is EIE's 
investments and marketing strategies as a follow-up to Kuranari's declaration 
that the Japanese government would supply as much assistance as possible to 
make the South Pacific more prosperous. In what was obviously an attempt to 
gain an economic advantage and favourable political leverage EIE, in July 
1988, flew Fiji's Prime Minister Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, members of his 
cabinet and trade representatives to Tokyo on what was supposedly a fact-
finding mission. The Japanese company paid for all expenses. Again on 
12 May 1989, the same company flew the Chief Minister of the Territorial 
Assembly of French Polynesia, Alexandre Leontieff and fifteen Tahitian 
politicians and officials to Tokyo. Thus it was not surprising that soon after 
each trip EIE negotiated investments in excess of $400 million in Fiji and more 
than $152 million on resort-developments in Tahiti. 15 
For Japan, the visits to the South Pacific by Prime Minister Nakasone 
and Foreign Minister Abe in 1985, and again by Foreign Minister Kuranari in 
1987, were extremely valuable insofar as they confirmed Tokyo's 'willingness' to 
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be more actively involved in the region. 16 The visits were also useful in that 
soon after the rhetoric, a train of initiatives followed, which led at least one 
Pacific island leader to comment that 'he [Kuranari] is a very experienced 
magician'. 17 Since 1985, Japan's activist approach to the practical 
implementation of its diplomatic initiatives and promises has impressed many 
Pacific island leaders. 
Following the declaration of the Kuranari Doctrine in 1987, the Japanese 
government established a $2 million special funding for island states and 
invited leaders of the SPF to annual dialogues. Visits to Tokyo by high ranking 
officials had already been made through the Director of the Forum Secretariat, 
Henry Naisali, and Forum Chairman Vaai Kolone. Kuranari's promise of a 
survey team to formulate new guidelines for future bilateral and multilateral 
aid duly arrived two months later, in March-April. The mission visited 
Australia, Western Samoa, Fiji, Vanuatu and Kiribati. 18 Sensitive to the strong 
anti-nuclear feeling of the Forum states, and conscious of the importance of a 
nuclear-free Pacific as central to the question of future political influence, the 
Foreign Minister took the opportunity to offer his full 'personal' support for the 
Treaty of Rarotonga. It is not difficult to imagine the air of 'sincerity' that 
would have prevailed when Kuranari reminded his audience of his first-hand 
experience of the nuclear threat, as a resident of N agasaki.19 
Since Kuranari's visit, Japanese activities on several fronts have 
intensified. Aside from ODA commitments already mentioned, Japan 
contributed $A 700,000 to the $27 million Tuvalu Trust Fund (TIF) which had 
been established by Australia, United Kingdom and New Zealand.20 And in 
what was obviously intended as a means for gaining greater political influence 
from within the region, Tokyo made it be known that it was interested in 
becoming a member of the SPC.21 On another front, the number of Japanese 
visitors to SPEC showed a very marked increase; visitors who included 
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representatives of government, senior government organisations, the private 
sector and the media.22 A growing interchange of government missions from 
the South Pacific has also been evident. Within a period of just fifteen months 
from April 1987 to July 1988, a total of twenty-two Pacific island leaders visited 
Japan, including four Prime Ministers and a President, sixteen Cabinet 
Ministers (3 of them Deputy Prime Ministers), and other senior citizens, most 
of them at the invitation of the Japanese government.23 Again in what can only 
be described as a piece of clever diplomacy to demonstrate its support for 
microstates in an international forum, Japan voted in favour of the Forum-
sponsored resolution that put New Caledonia on the list of dependent 
territories to be scrutinised by the UN Decolonisation Committee. In a later 
meeting of the General Assembly, however, Japan abstained.24 
Cheque Book Diplomacy 
One of the issues which demonstrates the nature of Japanese diplomacy, and 
the extent to which it will go to secure its own economic interests, is the 
fisheries dispute which arose over the level of access fees, and the use of 
gillnetting-the so-called 'wall of death'. In the two years leading to a SPF 
meeting in Kiribati, held on 10-11 July 1989, disagreement between Japan and 
the PICs over gillnetting and fishing rights led to a deterioration of relations. 
Relations were strained in March 1987 when the PNG-Japan fishing agreement 
was terminated because of a Japanese refusal to pay higher access fees for 
rights to PNG's territorial waters, fees which incidentally had already been 
paid by South Korea. This was followed by a termination of agreements with 
the Solomon Islands, Marshall Islands, French Polynesia, Wallis and Futuna, 
New Caledonia and Tuvalu.25 Japan also refused to enter into a multilateral 
treaty similar to that reached between the US and PICs in 1986, maintaining 
that bilateral agreements were more than satisfactory. For PICs, however, 
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there are obvious benefits in negotiating as a bloc, especially when all, with the 
exception of PNG, are relatively small, resource-poor and aid-dependent and do 
not have a strong economic, political or diplomatic clout.26 
Relations were still at a low point when gill netting surfaced and became 
the new priority item on the Forum agenda in Kiribati. At issue was the fact 
that the gillnet technique specifically designed to snare albacore tuna by the 
gills, also caught porpoise, dolphins, small whales and sea birds which, 
according to the FF A, caused a serious depletion of marine resources. For tiny 
island states like Tuvalu where fish is their only major resource, the matter is 
of critical importance. It had been estimated that stocks of fish such as tuna 
could be seriously depleted within five years if the current catch-rates 
continued unchecked. 27 The microstates argued that to destroy marine life as 
the Japanese, Taiwanese and South Korean fishing fleets were doing, was 
ultimately to threaten their very surviva1.28 It was against this background 
that the SPF declared an immediate halt to further indiscriminate, 
irresponsible and destructive use of gillnetting with driftnets. 29 In economic 
terms, there can be little doubt about the viability of the Japanese technique of 
gillnetting in that catches are bigger and ships do not require the large crews 
needed by the longliners. 3o On a long-term basis, however, it is difficult to deny 
its devastating impact on marine resources. But what is also of concern to 
microstates is not only that Japan has been uncompromising over the issue, but 
also the way in which Tokyo responded, and the manner in which it went about 
counteracting the deeply-felt concern of tiny vulnerable island economies. 
In the first . instance, Japan went to great lengths to defend its position 
by covering up and even publishing falsified figures about the effects of 
gillnetting. In fact, Japan refused to release most of its data. As well, Tokyo 
did its best 'to avoid the imposition of international control on high seas gillnet 
fishing. 3 ! The deception and hypocrisy of Japan's stance is shown by the fact 
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that while island states were challenged to provide clear, scientific evidence of 
the devastating impact of gillnetting, Japan itself has prohibited gillnetting in 
areas up to 1,000 kilometres from its shores.32 
With mounting pressure from PICs to abandon the use of driftnetting, 
Japan then resorted to 'chequebook diplomacy'; a countermeasure which can 
only be described as arrogant and characteristic of a self-seeking Japan. In a 
period of just twenty-eight days, Japan applied chequebook diplomacy with 
considerable effect. Within hours of reiterating its refusal to abandon the use 
of gillnets at the Suva conference held 26-28 June 1989, it was announced that 
Western Samoa was accepting an offer of $11.4 million from Japan to pay for 
the second phase of the Apia Port Development project. At about the same 
time, Japan gave $7.4 million to the Solomon Islands for a fisheries project, and 
$1.7 million to Fiji for fishing equipment.33 Only two weeks later, in the days 
prior to the Forum in Kiribati, Japan gave Kiribati $6.7 million for a new 
hospital. On 20 July it donated $1 million to Tuvalu for a fishing project. 
Several days later, Vanuatu received $8 million for its new airport terminal 
with Tonga receiving a promise of funding for a similar project at Tonga's 
airport. A Japanese company also gave $10,000 to Vanuatu to help sponsor a 
team of disabled athletes to Tokyo.34 
Having thus 'softened' the microstates, in December Japan next applied 
pressure at the UN by insisting that certain parts of the original resolution, 
specifically that which called for an immediate 'halt to large-scale driftnetting 
in the South Pacific region by June 30, 1990', be changed to accommodate 
Japanese concerns.35 This move by Japan placed considerable pressure on PICs 
to reconsider their position. If they stood by their original draft, Tokyo might 
simply ignore the resolution. It had happened before. 'Japan's abysmal record 
on slaughtering whales in defiance of international conventions also speaks 
volumes about its callous lack of concern for the natural environment. '36 There 
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was also a further important consideration for PICs. Although the MFA in 
Tokyo had consistently denied any links between fisheries negotiations and 
ODA, Japan could threaten to withdraw or suspend further aid. 37 It is not clear 
how this issue has been resolved, but these vigorous countermeasures do reflect 
the economic motive which underlies Japanese involvement in the region. They 
clearly show that, when Japanese economic interests are thwarted, Japan 
asserts its political and economic clout to gain its objectives. 
A Broad-based Approach 
In another sphere, Japan has used her relationships with Australia and New 
Zealand effectively to facilitate her economic and political involvement in the 
South Pacific. As 'traditional' donors with a long experience of dealing with 
island states, Japan recognised the benefits to be derived from working closely 
wi th Canberra and Wellington. Apart from utilising their 'know how', a 
cooperative effort also promotes a more effective coordination of aid 
programmes, thereby avoiding any unnecessary duplication and wastage of 
resources. The possibility of generating conflicting interests with Canberra and 
Wellington would also be minimised while Japan advances her own agenda. As 
well, Japan does not want to be seen as an intruder in a region where Australia 
and New Zealand have economic and political interests of long standing. 38 It 
was Japan's recognition of diplomacy as an effective tool to achieve these 
advantages and most importantly, to maintain an on-going dialogue with 
Canberra and Wellington that culminated in the establishment of an Annual 
Consultative meeting in 1985. 
By the same token, however, Japan is not the sole beneficiary of this 
strategy. As long-time actors in the region both Australia and New Zealand 
also stood to gain. Insofar as Japan is Australia's most important trading 
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partner and with a strong possibility of it also becoming its largest source of 
foreign capita139 , regular dialogue with Japan is highly desirable. Also Japan is 
a major force in the emerging Asia-Pacific Economic Community. Greater 
access to Japan's huge domestic market is important to Canberra. As well, it is 
in Australia's interest to be aware of Tokyo's economic, political and strategic 
objectives at the regional and global level. In the South Pacific this is 
especially important in . VIew of Canberra's strategy of 'constructive 
commitment' articulated by Foreign Minister Gareth Evans early in 1989.40 
Moreover, by working more closely together, opportunities for joint 
ventures between Japanese, Australian and New Zealand companies are 
greatly enhanced. Japan's decision to untie the engineering services 
components of aDA loans after April 1988, opened up new opportunities for 
Australian firms. AIDAB suggests that Australian businesses that may profit 
from this deal are those 'with specialist expertise, particularly those having 
successfully participated in the Australian aid programme'.41 In PNG, joint 
ventures between Australia and Japanese interests in such companies as 
Carpenter Kaigai, GoUin Kyokuyo and Thiess Sobu are further examples of the 
link-up to exploit the resources jointly.42 The likelihood of joint ventures being 
used more extensively as a strategy is increased by the fact that by May 1990, 
more than fifty Japanese financial institutions supporting Japanese business 
ties were established in Australia as well as the 350 Japanese-owned 
subsidiaries now in operation.43 
While an increase in Japanese-related investments is desirable, and will 
be welcomed by many PICs, it is well to remember that they do not always 
work within the legal framework established by the recipient countries. As the 
following examples from PNG show, underhand means are sometimes 
employed to secure Japanese economic objectives. In 1976, the Japanese 
government was accused of threatening to withdraw some pending aid if a 
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proposed venture in which a Japanese company was involved did not proceed.44 
In another instance, a Japanese company executive offered a $75,000 cheque to 
the then Minister of Energy for PNG, and an expensive diamond to a Special 
Assistant to Prime Minister Michael Somare, apparently with the intention of 
securing their support for mining rights and developmental projects.45 Such 
devious practices, however, are not unique to the Japanese, as shown by the 
Indonesian Armed Forces Chief, General Benny Murdani's alleged 'payment' of 
$139,400 to fund the electoral campaign of the Forestry Minister and former 
PNG military commander, Ted Diro.46 
Two other strategies which have been effective in facilitating Japanese 
economic interests have been that of safeguarding 'top jobs' at the decision-
making level for Japanese staff and, of utilising local expertise in recipient 
countries. Both strategies have been used extensively in major Japanese 
investments around the globe. Experience in the US shows a clear preference 
for Japanese at the management level and 'it is rare that an American holds 
top spot in any Japanese-owned firm'.47 In terms of using local expertise, 
Japanese government and private-sector interests have often enlisted the 
services and influence of former government officials, consultants and 
academics to advance Japanese goals. The use of Fred Bergsten, a former 
assistant Treasury Secretary under President Carter, in trade negotiations 
with the US is an example.48 
Though certainly on a much smaller scale, Japan also employs the same 
strategies in the South Pacific. In major fisheries and mining investments, 
senior management posts are held mainly by Japanese company employees. 
Fiji found this out when it took over the management of the Pacific Fishing 
Company from the Japanese giant C. Itoh and Co. Ltd. EIE's employment of 
Andrew Thomson, formerly one of Fiji's outstanding hoteliers and Richard 
Bailey, a former manager of the Tahiti Tourism Promotion Board49 , to expand 
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EIE's involvement in the developing tourist industry in these two countries 
show that Japanese business interests will undoubtedly draw on high profile 
local expertise in order to secure its economic objectives. 
Privately funded voluntary organisations such as the Japan-Pacific 
Society have also been used as conduits for Japanese influence both by 
government and the private sector. Established in 1978, the society was aimed 
at fostering closer relations with the people of the South Pacific. Society 
President, Noboru Gotoh, was a major force behind the creation of the PBEC. 
In 1981, he was responsible for a substantial gift of equipment to the Vanuatu 
government. Multi-millionaire Gotoh is also head of Tokyu Corporation which 
purchased Vanuatu's Hotel Lagon in 1988.50 The creation of the Japan-PNG 
Goodwill Society and Coordinating Association provide two other examples. 
Allied with these developments is the strong desire by Japan's Department of 
Tourism to be involved in the South Pacific. 51 
As well, there have been collaborative efforts between government and 
prominent individuals such as alleged crime boss Ryoichi Sasakawa. Though 
heading one of the biggest gambling operations in Japan, the former Class II 
war criminal, multi-billionaire Ryoichi Sasakawa's activities in the South 
Pacific have been closely linked to advancing Japan's political objectives. 
Through the Sasakawa Peace Foundation, a Pacific Islands Foundation Fund of 
$24 million has been established, along with a Sasakawa Young Leaders 
Fellowship fund at the USP. Organised by the MFA, Sasakawa sponsored a 
conference/seminar for Pacific islands leaders in Tokyo in 1987.52 Also in the 
same year, prior to Fiji's crucial general elections, the Sasakawa Foundation 
named the about-to-be dethroned leader Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara as 'Pacific 
Man of the Year'. Mara received a cheque for one hundred thousand dollars. 
The prize has not been awarded since. 
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As in their relationship with the US and ASEAN, one thing is certain 
about Japanese strategies used in the South Pacific. They are aimed at jointly 
advancing Japanese economic and strategic interests. Also, political power and 
influence play an important part in the process. Today, a major task on the 
Japanese agenda in the South Pacific is to influence the present and future 
leaders of the region as they have done in America and elsewhere in Asia. 53 
This broad strategy is managed through the collaboration of government, 
business interests, voluntary organisations and prominent individuals both at 
home and abroad. Together, the strategies employed provide a clear signpost of 
long-term Japanese economic interests in the region. 
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Chapter III 
MOTIVATIONS AND UNDERLYmG FORCES 
An understanding of Japan's econormc relations and the motivations for 
increasing its role in the South Pacific is gained by viewing this economic 
involvement within a global context. A global perspective is important. 
Advances in human knowledge and technology have brought nations big and 
small, rich and poor, closer together, irrespective of economic status or political 
ideology. In turn, such advances have enhanced an acceptance of the reality of 
a world composed of interdependent nations. Indeed, it could be said that the 
'revolutionary forces' which have recently restructured the map of 
contemporary Europe have been generated by a recognition of the world as an 
'interlocking' system and of the concept of interdependence as a crucial factor in 
international relations. This observation was aptly made in 1980 by the 
Independent Commission on International Development Issues, under the 
chairmanship of former West German Chancellor, Willy Brandt: 
While the international system has become more complicated, 
with more independent nations, more institutions and more 
centres of influence, it has also become much more 
interdependent. More and more local problems can only be solved 
through international solutions ... The South cannot grow 
adequately without the North. The North cannot prosper or 
improve its situation unless there is greater progress in the 
South. 1 
It is for these reasons, that Japan's economic involvement should be 
viewed, at least initially from beyond the narrow confines of the South Pacific. 
The economic interests of giant Japan in the South Pacific can be fully 
understood only when examined within a global framework. In this chapter, 
we look briefly at the underlying forces which gave impetus to Japanese 
economic involvement in the South Pacific in terms of Japan's rise as a global 
economic power and of its gradual move towards what Chalmers Johnson calls 
the 'internationalisation of the Japanese economy'.2 The economic motives, and 
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in particular the Kuranari Doctrine which acknowledged the political-strategic 
importance of the region, are also discussed. 
The Rise of an Economic Power 
From her defeat in 1945, Japan has achieved a remarkable recovery and 
growth. Initially under American tutorship, the 1950s was a period of 
reconstruction, followed in the 1960s by implementation of national 'income-
doubling growth'. 3 These first twenty years of recovery were followed by two 
decades of tremendous productivity that eventually thrust the Japanese 
economy into global standing. In 1960, Japan's share of the world's GNP was 
only 3 per cent, compared to America's 36 per cent. By 1986, this figure had 
risen fourfold, to slightly more than one-half of that for the US of 23 per cent.4 
There were other indicators of a surge in Japan's economic performance. 
By 1981, Japan had become the world's most important capital exporter. Its 
trade surplus, which rose dramatically from about $35 billion in 1983 to 
$53 billion in 1985, enabled it to become a major world financial power.5 In 
1983, Japan's net capital outflow was only $17.7 billion a year; one year later, it 
had jumped to $49.7 billion and again to $64.5 billion in 1985.6 A year later in 
1986, Japan's net assets abroad had risen to $129.8 billion making it the 
world's largest creditor nation; Great Britain's net assets abroad in the same 
year were $90 billion and West Germany's were $50 billion. 7 It should be noted 
that Japan's rise to become the world's leading creditor nation was parallelled 
by America's decline into debt.s 
Japan's achievement in the world of international finance has also been 
impressive. Ten of the world's largest banks are now owned by the Japanese.9 
This is a remarkable accomplishment since only three decades ago no Japanese 
banks were listed in the American-led top ten. Such is the magnitude of the 
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economic miracle that has given Japan super-power status. And though some 
scholars still do not agree that Japan should be labelled a superpower, there is 
no disputing the fact that Japan is poised to become the world's leading 
economic power into the next century. 10 
Becoming a major economic power has entailed an increased sense of 
responsibility towards the wider global community. It should however, be 
noted that Japan's acknowledgement of wider global responsibilities was not 
entirely of her own making. During the last decade, the US, for economic and 
strategic reasons, consistently applied pressure on Japan to 'share the burden' 
of maintaining world peace and security. For example, it is claimed that the 
increase in Japanese ODA in recent years is at least partly a response to 
American pressure in view of a growing Soviet presence in the South Pacific. ll 
Yet Japan has not been unwilling to accept an international role commensurate 
with her economic strength, as can be seen from the clearly expressed views of 
Japanese governments in recent years. Prime Minister Suzuki Zenko in 1986 
acknowledged Japan's 'new' role in these words: 
Japan is ready to become, by completely changing its heretofore 
passive attitude, a nation which will actively fulfil its 
international responsibility to strengthen and promote world 
peace and development. From a passive beneficiary to an active 
creator-this, I might say, is the third start for our country. 12 
The geographical distribution of its ODA during the last two decades also 
indicates how Japan has, of her own accord, enacted a gradual move towards an 
'internationalised' commitment. From an almost entirely regional focus on 
Asia, Japan has moved towards a more global strategy by incorporating more 
third-world countries into its aid policy. Up to 1970, 98.3 per cent of Japan's 
total bilateral ODA went to countries in Asia while all other regions received 
only 1.7 per cent. By 1985 the situation had changed quite dramatically: while 
Asia still remained the major recipient of Japanese aid, receiving about 67 per 
cent of the total Japanese ODA, regions outside Asia now received 34 per cent. 
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Allocations to other third world regions expanded, especially in Central and 
South America, the Middle East and Africa. This globalised-trend in Japanese 
ODA grew from $2.637 billion in 1979 to $9.134 billion in 1988.13 Moreover the 
value of trade between Japan and the Third World, over a period of three 
decades also increased from only $6 billion in 1958 to $145 billion in 1987. 14 
Other more recent offers of economic assistance demonstrate Japan's 
renewed commitment to globalise its economic involvement. At the 14th 
Summit Meeting in Toronto in 1988, through Prime Minister, Noboru 
Takeshita, Japan gave a commitment of $50 billion in foreign aid for the 
developing world, over the next five year period. (Incidentally, Japan's 
allocation of $10 billion in foreign aid for 1988 alone, surpassed that of the US 
of $9.2 billion.) In the same year, Japan contributed nearly 11 per cent of the 
UN's annual budget.15 Japan has also invested extensively around the world, 
through its private companies and large multinational corporations. The 
magnitude of Japan's economic capability is perhaps nowhere better illustrated 
than in the Mitsubishi Corporation's recent offer, in February this year, to pay 
off Brazil's entire debt of $130 billion in return for mining and logging rights of 
that country's entire forest resources. 16 
What has become obvious in recent years is that a conviction has taken 
hold in the national Japanese consciousness, that Japan's major task today 
should be the internationalisation of the Japanese economy.17 In terms of 
foreign policy, this translates into a firm commitment to an active and involved, 
rather than a passive and reactive, approach to international relations. 
Essentially what this means is that Japan, through its MITI and large 
Japanese private business interests, and its MFA, has now embarked on a 
policy to enhance and develop its diplomatic and political relations with 
countries around the globe with the ultimate goal of exploiting their economic 
resources for Japanese commercial gain. The impact of Japan's economic 
48 
dominance on the world economy may vary in different contexts but it is always 
significant and Japan will certainly remain a major actor into the twenty-first 
century. 
The extent to which Japan has become actively engaged in the South 
Pacific can, in part, be explained by the evolution of its post-war foreign policy 
and its rise as a world economic power. Until the mid-1970s Japan's overriding 
preoccupation was economic growth through commercial and industrial 
development. Under this policy, Japan maintained a low political profile and it 
advanced trade and investments with all nations (although it concentrated 
mainly in Asia), while avoiding involvement in almost all international issues. 18 
This policy was abruptly interrupted in 1973 by the OPEC initiative which 
resulted in the first major oil crisis. In Japan there was alarm because of 
Tokyo's dependence on the Middle East for 99 per cent of its oil. 
The oil crisis made it clear to policy-makers in Tokyo that a policy which 
separated economics from politics was no longer viable; hence the birth in the 
late 1970s of a 'comprehensive security policy' which 'involved diplomatic 
involvement in relatively non-controversial issues while diversifying sources of 
foreign markets, cheap labour, energy and raw materials. 19 In other words, the 
strategic and political dimensions in Japan's economic cooperation policy now 
started to receive greater emphasis. For Prime Minister Ohira Masayoshi, a 
comprehensive multidimensional strategy was essential for the realisation of 
Japan's total security. This was to be achieved 'not by military power alone, 
but through the linked support of economic power, information, political power 
and diplomacy.2o Rix comments on this approach in these words: 
it involves the idea of an integrated security strategy covering 
military, diplomatic and economic aspects. It involves a more 
explicit defence effort that includes cooperation regionally ... It 
also incorporates diplomatic moves to strengthen ties with so-
called 'friendly' nations. Finally, it has purposefully attempted to 
make Japanese trade, aid and investment services work in its own 
interests by helping the recipients of these benefits. 21 
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It would seem that the changed emphasis and behaviour in Japanese 
involvement in the South Pacific during the 1980s, can be clearly traced to the 
application of this multi-dimensional approach in Japan's foreign policy, 
Indeed, this view constitutes the basis upon which the underlying argument is 
presented in this study; the development of a growing economic relationship 
between Japan and the South Pacific takes its origin from an endeavour by 
Japan initially to advance its economic interests, and since the 1980s, its 
political and strategic interests as well. 22 One report sums up the strategy in 
this way: 
Japan prefers to use diplomatic and political influence backed up 
by its substantial economic power and aid to promote its interests 
in the region.23 
The effectiveness of this strategy was recognised by President Nixon in 
July 1971, when, in referring to Japan, China, the USSR, the US and Western 
Europe as the five centres of world economic power, he said that 'economic 
power will be the key to all kinds ofpower'.24 It is clear that Japan now uses a 
comprehensive multi-dimensional strategy in the South PacificIn terms of the 
marked increase in Japanese activities in the South Pacific: through diplomacy 
as reflected by the visits of Nakasone, Abe and Kuranari and other high-
ranking government officials; through the interchange of government missions 
from the South Pacific; through Japan's effort to become a member of the SPC 
and through the increase in Japanese economic assistance. Japan has initiated 
moves in many fronts and has especially emphasised economic assistance 
because, as Gaston Sigur, the US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian 
and Pacific Affairs recently commented:, 'economic aid is security aid',25 
This is not to deny that there were also humanitarian motives In 
Japanese policy, nor indeed that other factors such as pressure from the US to 
'share the burden' of security, and requests from the SPF also contributed to 
Japan's comprehensive engagement, but rather to emphasise the point that 
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such factors were of secondary importance. Insofar as the South Pacific is 
concerned, it is argued that, since the 1980s, the same multi-dimensional 
approach has been adopted to advance Japanese economic involvement as 
strategic and political motives became increasingly important for Japan. 
Economic Motives 
In terms of understanding Japan's economic involvement in the region, it is 
important to view it in relation to Japanese foreign economic policy which 
evolved initially from an overriding preoccupation with economic development 
and transformed into a political-strategic emphasis during the 1980s. Though 
insignificant by international standards, the relationship with Japan has been 
very important for the island states not only in terms of providing much-needed 
aid and manufactured goods, but also by providing one of the largest export-
markets for the South Pacific. What then have been the economic motivations 
for Japanese involvement? 
Very obviously the need for raw materials has been a primary motive. 
Initial Japanese interests in the region emanated from a need for resources 
such as nickel and phosphate from New Caledonia and French Polynesia. 
Interest in other raw materials soon followed. In terms of actual involvement, 
Japan's past knowledge of the potential economic resources of the region helped 
facilitate an active role as many Japanese already had a long experience in the 
Pacific, particularly in Papua New Guinea and Micronesia. 26 Their knowledge 
and involvement at the political and economic levels in Tokyo undoubtedly 
enhanced a strong existing motivation to exploit the resources of the region. 
This was especially true of the resource rich islands of Melanesia, and with 
PNG in particular. In the case of PNG, Japan was also attracted by its 
strategic location.27 
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That Japan had long had an interest in the wealth of the region is borne 
out by the fact that even before PNG gained independence in 1975, Japanese 
economic interests had already been initiated through diplomatic contacts in 
1972 between Japan's Foreign Minister Ohira Mayayoshi and Michael So mare 
the then Chief Minister of the Australian colony. Matters such as Japanese 
economic assistance, trade relations with Japan and Japanese investments in 
PNG were discussed at that meeting.28 But nowhere is Japan's motive for an 
economic engagement more clearly demonstrated than in the attempt by a 
giant Japanese conglomerate some twenty years ago to buy PNG from 
Australia. And when that bid failed, another huge Japanese consortium offered 
to lease the colony for fifty years in order to develop it. 29 
Thus it does not come as a surprise that Japan has made considerable 
investments in the South Pacific timber and mining industry, most notably in 
PNG, Fiji and the Solomon Islands. In the case of PNG, the involvement of 
Japanese and other foreign companies in the lumbering and mining industry 
has been lucrative for the foreign companies. Tragically for the host nation 
however, the ecological and social costs have been so extensive that lumbering 
licenses were cancelled and a number of mainly Japanese and South Korean 
logging firms were ordered out after a judicial enquiry, thus leading the PNG 
government belatedly to enforce stricter environmental regulations. 30 
The fishing industry has also attracted keen Japanese interest over the 
last two decades, culminating in those agreements with island states already 
discussed. Japan saw the obvious need to exploit this readily available 
resource. Japan had the expertise and the equipment to build up a regional 
fishing industry. Furthermore the economic returns from such an investment 
were assured by Japan's domestic market for which fish is a staple food. 
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Japan has also shown a keen interest in the sea-bed minerals of the 
region. The announcement by the Japanese government in March 1990 of a 
$27 million research programme reflects the extent of that interest.3! For the 
island countries, finding out if their marine areas (EEZs) contain mineral 
resources that could be used now or in future is of great economic and even 
strategic importance, and although the exploitation of sea minerals is not yet 
economically viable, knowledge of their potential is needed. For Japan, 
providing the technology and the scientists for the task constitutes a role 
commensurate with its economic capacity and also offers long-term involvement 
through the provision of technology and expertise for exploiting these resources 
into the next century. 
Japan's economic interest in the region has also been motivated by her 
capacity to recognise and develop the potential of a number of industries. 
Tourism is a case in point. As previously mentioned, having recognised the 
potential in the industry, several Japanese companies invested extensively not 
only in the resort-facilities of the island destinations, but also in airlines 
servicing the region and in market sources extending well beyond the South 
Pacific. Thus, by 1990, the large growth in travel by Japanese for business and 
recreation purposes, has become a significant factor in Japan's relations with 
the PICs.32 That trend is likely to continue. 
Although not often cited as a strong motivation, it is argued that since 
1979, Japan has embarked on an unprecedented build-up of economic aid in 
order to influence and thereby gain acceptance by PICs of her proposal to dump 
low-level nuclear wastes in the region. Nuclear waste storage will continue to 
be a major problem for Japan because Tokyo expects to more than double her 
nuclear capacity within fifteen years. This means that Japan will have in 
excess of 70,000 drums of waste piling up every year from her twenty-five 
nuclear reactors.33 With this problem in mind, Japan has increased its ODA 
53 
substantially and has consistently sought an on-goIng dialogue with the 
microstates. In fact, soon after the return of teams of scientists of the Science 
and Technology Agency who had met strong opposition in their attempt to 
reassure Pacific Islanders of the safety of Japan's proposal, there was pressure 
from members of the Japanese Parliament to increase aid to all PICs.34 Toshio 
Doko, President of the Federation of Economic Organisations, stressed the real 
motivation behind Japan's increased involvement when he declared that 
the problem of nuclear waste dumping cannot be settled unless 
Japan gives security [economic] and some benefits to the Pacific 
people.35 
In my view, the strong South Pacific opposition to Tokyo's dumping 
proposal in 1980 provided the initial impetus for Japan's decision to increase its 
ODA. Fears of Soviet initiatives and growing instability only reinforced the 
existing Japanese strategy. In the face of these concerns, Japan's response was 
to increase her economic aid to the region. She also facilitated the sponsorship 
of 'goodwill' tours to Japan by leading Pacific Islanders in order to impress upon 
them the safety standards administered at nuclear plants, and the safety 
precautions of the dumping proposal. 
In effect this aid was a 'window-dressing' measure to appease the 
opposition of PICs. It must be remembered even now that the Japanese 
government has only postponed indefinitely the proposal to dump nuclear 
wastes in the region. Though sensitive to the regional opposition, the Japanese 
government has never 'officially' declared its abandonment of the scheme. The 
Government's true position is probably best explained by the fact that nuclear 
waste dumping at sea is relatively cheap and 'safe', especially when the 
proposed site near the Marshall Islands is a considerable distance from Tokyo. 
As one Japanese official observed: 'Dumping at sea costs less than land 
dumping. The only cost is the sea transport, but on land you need the storage 
facility and security arrangements'.36 
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What can be concluded from these initiatives IS that the Japanese 
government is planning ahead. With the likelihood of a future Japanese 
economic dominance in the region, the economically dependent PICs, will soon 
no longer be in a position to continue their opposition, but will accept the 
dumping proposal as a trade-off. 
Political-Strategic Motives and the Kuranari Doctrine 
To understand Japan's more recent initiatives in the South Pacific, it is 
important to acknowledge the changing context in which these advances have 
been made. The past three decades in the once isolated Pacific have been a 
period of unprecedented political and economic change. This was especially 
true of the 1980s with the growing involvement and conflicting interests of new 
external powers. In the lead-up to their independence, the decolonisation 
process had proceeded relatively peacefully for most island countries except for 
Vanuatu which gained its independence from Britain and France in 1980, and 
for French Polynesia and especially New Caledonia, which are both still 
involved in the struggle for independence,. Although some observers such as 
David Robie would not entirely agree that decolonisation in the South Pacific 
had been as peaceful as suggested here37 , for most island states, the post-
independence years were by and large a period of relative stability and 
cooperation with their former Western colonial powers. As Hegarty notes, until 
about the mid-1980s: 
The island states of the Pacific were basically pro-Western in 
orientation and all appeared content to shelter under the regional 
security umbrella of the ANZUS treaty.38 
This orientation began to change slowly with the advent of diplomatic 
initiatives from new powers such as Japan and China. Since then, many other 
new players, with a variety of motives have made advances into the region. 
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Compared to the post-war period up to 1970, foreign power involvement has 
been extensive in the last two decades, and especially since 1980. Aside from 
the 'traditional' Western powers, other players now include Japan, China, 
Indonesia, the Soviet Union, Taiwan, India, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, 
Western Germany, Norway, Israel and Brunei. With the advent of so many 
foreign powers, conflicting interests and some changes became inevitable for 
PICs. Furthermore, the post-independence period has witnessed a deliberate 
effort by island states to achieve a diversification of diplomatic and trade 
linkages for they know that it is those countries 'with the greatest and most 
diverse external ties that do best in aid, trade and crucial economic 
concessions'.39 
A renewed Japanese interest in the 1980s was generated by the 
increasing Soviet presence in the region. Two Soviet initiatives had culminated 
in fishing agreements with Kiribati and Vanuatu. Another contributing factor 
was the breakdown in the ANZUS treaty, following the refusal of New 
Zealand's Labour government in 1984 to accept visits by US nuclear-powered 
ships. These and other factors which are discussed below contributed 
significantly to Tokyo's perception of a threat of growing Soviet influence in the 
region. With superpower rivalry still dominating international relations in the 
mid-1980s, Japan felt compelled to become more actively involved in the South 
Pacific in order to ensure stability and to safeguard Western security interests. 
For Japan, Soviet initiatives and the advent of other diplomatic and economic 
interests signalled the possibility of further instability in a region of growing 
strategic importance. 
The articulation of the Kuranari Doctrine in 1987, was essentially the 
Japanese response to increased superpower rivalry in the South Pacific. The 
Doctrine served to give official notice of Japan's recognition of the region's 
strategic significance. As well, it made clear Japan's desire for a greater 
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political influence. Whereas, as we have seen, initial Japanese involvement in 
the South Pacific had earlier been dominated by economic and commercial 
motives, this was no longer the case. Herr registered this point emphatically: 
The Kuranari Doctrine was not prompted by intrinsic commercial 
interests. Instability in the post-Marcos Philippines, Soviet access 
to base facilities in Vietnam, and Moscow's fisheries agreements 
with Kiribati and Vanuatu all helped convince Tokyo of the 
vulnerability of its southern approaches and the need to pay more 
direct attention to the islands.40 
This is not to deny the importance of economic and commercial relations with 
Japan but merely to point out that by the mid-1980s, political and strategic 
objectives had also become important motivations for Japan. In a sense the 
Kuranari Doctrine merely gave official acknowledgement to Japan's recognition 
of changes which had already occurred. 
Strategically, the region had become increasingly important to Japan for 
the simple reason that the vast Pacific Ocean provides vital sea-lanes for 
Japan's trade. This became an important consideration in terms of the 
emerging Asia-Pacific Economic Community. With the possibility of an 
American withdrawal from the Philippines, fears about the security of the 
Japanese merchant fleet and of the whole region were heightened.41 In Japan, 
this led to growing unease and ultimately to an acceptance of a greater 
responsibility for its security needs.42 Yet whereas the US depended on its 
military and naval capacity, Japan did not have such options because of the 
restrictions imposed by its 'peace' constitution which prohibits Japanese naval 
defense capacity from extending beyond a one thousand miles radius.43 It is in 
the context of these fears and developments that Japan developed a 
'comprehensive' non-military strategy involving political aid and diplomatic 
initiatives to ensure regional political stability.44 
Japan's increased involvement in the South Pacific can also be seen as a 
response to Soviet initiatives. This is certainly true insofar as Japan has, 
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through the US-Japan Security Pact regarded itself as part of the Western 
Alliance Security System45; an alliance which inevitably viewed any Soviet 
initiatives whether economic, diplomatic or military as attempts to expand 
Moscow's sphere of influence. Although Kuranari did not specifically mention 
the Soviet Union by name when he declared that Japan 'cannot support the 
introduction of new tension into this peaceful and untroubled region', it is clear 
that the Foreign Minister was referring to Moscow's growing involvement in 
the South Pacific. It was therefore not surprising that Soviet fishing 
agreements with Kiribati (1985), Vanuatu (1987) and overtures for trade and 
diplomatic relations with Fiji, PNG, Tonga and Western Samoa, were seen as a 
threat to regional stability.46 This was disturbing for Japan especially in a 
region long-regarded as an 'American Lake'.47 In terms of the Soviet Union's 
fishing agreements with Kiribati and Vanuatu, Japanese concern was also 
motivated by commercial considerations. With the seas already being fished by 
some of the world's largest fishing nations, it was certainly not in Japan's 
economic interest to have the large Soviet fishing fleet in competition for the 
marine resources of the region. US-Japanese fears were also heightened by the 
Soviet Union's desire to develop its status as a Pacific power as expressed in 
Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech in July 1986. The fact that Pacific Island 
sympathy might be swayed by Soviet support and the ultimate ratification of 
the Rarotonga Treaty also became a matter of concern.48 
However, while there was some justification for this concern, it was also 
true that major Western powers were themselves indirectly responsible for 
initiatives by PICs which created openings for Soviet advances. This was 
especially true of the US. American support of the activities of the ATA (which 
had conducted illegal poaching in Kiribati's EEZ), its 'bullying' tactics over its 
handling of the 'Jeanette Diana' episode, and its refusal (until 1986) to agree to 
a multilateral treaty, incensed Kiribati, the Solomon Islands and most PICs. 
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Furthermore, the American and British refusal to support the Rarotonga 
Treaty and France's outright rebuttal of it certainly did not endear these 
Western nations to the Pacific microstates.49 
There was also considerable uncertainty about the future of ANZUS. It 
was therefore, not surprising, in this climate of growing anti-west sentiment, 
that Soviet advances were made and that Japan, with pressure from the US to 
share the burden of maintaining the Western Security system, sought to 
counter them. Japan's perception of the growing instability among the island 
states themselves was further strengthened by the two military coups in Fiji in 
1987 and the alleged Libyan connection with Vanuatu and New Caledonia. In 
1988, the Wanatabe Report recommended among other things, that Japan 
respond to political instability caused by growing nationalism and external 
intervention. 50 Towards this end, Japan therefore intensified her effort by 
providing yet more aid to this politically and strategically important area. 51 
Another contributing factor was the perception of a relative decline in 
Australia's and New Zealand's influence as their aid programmes were reduced. 
Tokyo's recognition of a deterioration in the Australian and New Zealand 
economies and the assurance that Australia would welcome a greater Japanese 
presence in the South Pacific, certainly helped to facilitate an increase in 
Japanese involvement. 52 As well, there were requests for aid from the 
microstates themselves. After their annual meeting in Rarotonga in August 
1985, the SPF sought to strengthen ties with Tokyo. Annual visits to Japan by 
the Director of the Forum Secretariat, Henry Naisali, have been made since 
1986.53 During the 1980s, the microstates have deliberately attempted to 
diversify their sources of aid, with Japan becoming a major alternative to 
traditional sources. Aside from PNG and Fiji, which have already had long 
established relations, other island states are now exploring what Japan has to 
offer. The initiative taken recently by Solomon Islands Foreign Minister, Sir 
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Baddeley Devesi, to attract Japanese and other Asian investors, reflects the 
growing desire by PIes for a greatly expanded role for Japan. 54 
Yet a close reading of the Kuranari Doctrine reveals the complex 
motivations for Japan's growing involvement in the region. While the South 
Pacific has certainly become a region of greater strategic significance, it is also 
true to say that the doctrine was articulated as a 'softener' for the expansion of 
Japan's economic interests. One thing is clear. The oft quoted expressions of 
Japanese altruism and unselfish concern for the well-being of small islands 
countries and her calls for 'neighbourly friendship' have not always been 
matched in practise by what PNG lawyer Tony Siaguru calls 'the aggressively 
self-seeking approach of Japanese industrial and commercial interests'. 
The contrast between official pronouncements about the benefits that 
derive from mutual cooperation, and the activities of Japanese industrial and 
commercial interests are most notable in the areas of fisheries and forestry. 
The actual consequences of Japanese involvement can be seen in the strategies 
and stance adopted by the Japanese Fishing Association through the Japanese 
Government over gillnetting; in the use of underhand methods to secure mining 
and timber projects for Japanese companies in Vanuatu and PNG; and in the 
deforestation of large areas in the Solomon Islands and particularly in PNG 
where Japanese companies have logged large areas 
then abruptly left without the furniture factories, wharves, mills 
and the reafforestation that had been an integral part of the 
agreement ... and on which the local villages had fondly based so 
many hopes ... they have been left with denuded lands, eroded 
soils and ruined reefs. They face a calamitous future. 55 
What is clearly established in the preceding discussion is that, for the 
most part, economic and commercial interests have remained the central 
motive for Japanese involvement in the South Pacific. However, due to 
unprecedented economic and political changes in the region, Japan has 
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broadened its interests in order to accommodate the region's growing strategic 
significance. 
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CONCLUSION 
In drawing this study to a conclusion, several observations can be made about 
Japan's economic relations with the South Pacific. First, the relationship has 
expanded significantly during the post-war decades. Until the mid-1970s, 
Japanese involvement concentrated mainly on the enhancement of the 
economic dimension of the relationship through trade and investment. During 
the past decade however, strategic and political interests have become 
important factors in explaining the nature of Japanese involvement in the 
regIon. Through increased trade, investment and ODA, and the use of 
sophisticated diplomacy, Japan has been able to extend its economic power and 
influence in the region. This development is likely to ensure that Japan will 
remain a major economic and political actor in the South Pacific into the next 
century. 
What then are the consequences and implications for this regIon in 
which Japan has become a major actor? First, there is likely to be a further 
restructuring of economic and political relations between PICs and external 
powers. Traditional powers like Australia and New Zealand are likely to see an 
erosion of their influence amongst the PICs as Asia through Japan, China, 
Taiwan and the ASEAN states gain a stronger economic foothold in the region. 
As a major power-broker in Asia, Japan will, in all likelihood, gain a significant 
leverage over Asia-Pacific relations. Australia and New Zealand will need to 
work through with Japan in bringing about change in the region. Already 
there are signs of this happening in the annual consultations which now take 
place between Australia, New Zealand and Japan. 
Second, in the area of trade, while the region will remain primarily an 
exporter of primary commodities to Japan, and provide a small but expanding 
market for Japanese manufactured goods, possibilities exist for new exports, 
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such as seabed minerals and petroleum to bring some balance to the large trade 
deficit between Japan and the PICs. Should this scenario eventuate, the region 
can be expected to see a considerable inflow of Japanese 'know-how' in terms of 
technology and skilled manpower. Japanese investment in the region, so far 
concentrated on forestry, minerals and fisheries, is likely to grow and expand 
into other sectors such as tourism, where major investments have already 
occurred in recent years. Large retirement villages and multi-purpose tourist 
enclaves, as preferred by Japanese investors such as the huge Denarau Island 
Resort in Fiji, will come to mark tourism development in the South Pacific. 
Pacific islanders will provide cheap labour and subtle forms of bribery will no 
doubt be used to buyout local politicians. 
Third, at the government level, sophisticated diplomacy, which has been 
a hallmark of Japanese initiatives will continue to playa significant role in 
Japan's larger regional role. Moreover, while collaboration between 
government and private business to develop regional links has always been 
close, the interests, and therefore the initiatives, of these two groups will 
increasingly become synonymous. Government leaders from the South Pacific 
can also expect to be courted a lot more by Japanese government and business 
leaders through various cultural exchange programmes. When these 
diplomatic initiatives fail, aggressive means such as those that were brought to 
bear upon PICs over their opposition to gillnet fishing are likely to be used. 
The Japanese are no strangers to chequebook diplomacy, whether it be to win 
diplomatic or commercial advantage. 
Fourth, regional political stability will be a major concern for Japan. 
From the Japanese viewpoint, stability in the South Pacific ultimately means 
peace and security for Japan, for the Western alliance and for the rest of the 
world. This viewpoint was expressed at a meeting of Japanese 
parliamentarians held in Tokyo in 1988 which declared the achievement of 
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economic, social and political stability for the South Pacific as a most urgent 
matter for Japan. Japan's concern for stability means that it may prefer to 
support 'safe' political allies, regardless of their domestic policies, as, for 
example, in the case of some Asian regimes, such as Indonesia with 
questionable human rights records. The leaders of PICs should recognise from 
Japan's past record that Japan, despite all the rhetoric of unselfish concern for 
the well-being of small islands economies, heeds only the strong. Japan too, 
will be using its own strengths both diplomatic and economic to extend its 
influence in the region and beyond. Thus Japanese involvement in the South 
Pacific cannot be fully explained by national economic interests alone. Rather, 
it is to be explained by wide political and strategic objectives, as well as by 
Japanese economic interests. 
What does this mean for the South Pacific? Basically, the challenge for 
PICs is to come to grips with the wider implications of this important 
international economic relationship. For only through such an understanding 
can Pacific islands leaders hope to make the informed decisions that are so 
necessary for their own long-term interests in a region of growing complexity. 
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It gives me great pleasure to have the privilege of outlining to you here in Fiji 
some of my thoughts on the future of the island states of the Pacific. 
It was in 1961 that I visited Fiji for the first time. Fiji and most of the 
other peoples in the Pacific were then moving towards independence, and I was 
profoundly impressed by the eagerness with which they desired to be self-
reliant. Seeing at first hand its peaceful and undisturbed life, I felt very 
strongly that the Pacific should be allowed to remain the peaceful sea that its 
name suggests. 
Since then, the island nations in the Pacific have, generally speaking, 
attained their independence in peace, and have concentrated their energies on 
nation-building. Despite the sometimes turbulent character of the 
international environment, they have worked for peace and stability, and as 
new members of the community of nations, have made their own contribution to 
the development of international order. 
The community of the Pacific island states has grown in number and 
geographical size, extending to both sides of the Equator. What we now call 
'the Pacific Island Region' has in recent years achieved significant political and 
economic coherence. This development is most desirable for the peace and 
prosperity of the whole region of the Pacific Ocean, and Japan certainly 
welcomes it. 
The history of the migration of peoples in the Pacific is a stirring one. In 
ancient times, when we knew nothing of modern navigation or ship 
construction, our ancestors, undaunted by the vastness of the ocean, gradually 
challenged and conquered it. 
Early in the 16th Century, Magellan, the first European to sail westward 
through the straits at the southern tip of the American continent, named the 
sea which he entered the Pacific Ocean. In the following years, travellers 
spread over the Ocean, engaging in commerce and stimulating the exchange of 
ideas. In those days this demanded an enormous spirit of adventure and high 
courage. 
In the last four centuries, however, the remarkable development of 
science and technology has drastically changed the situation. The pace of 
change has been particularly rapid in the last 25 years. The development of 
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various means of transportation and communication-for example, supersonic 
jet aircraft and telecommunication satellites-means that mankind now takes 
for granted previously undreamt-of speeds and virtually instantaneous 
communication. 
In the Pacific Region, the ocean that formerly hindered communication 
between peoples has become a highway for commerce and the exchange of 
infonnation among peoples. The countries of this region are becoming 
increasingly interdependent and are also enjoying closer relations with 
countries far distant. This means that they benefit from the world-wide 
development of human civilization, but also that they become involved in the 
turbulence of the international economy and international politics. 
Amidst these changes, the South Pacific Forum has called upon Japan to 
strengthen dialogue with this organization. The call came soon after I became 
Foreign Minister, and this has impelled me to revisit this region so that I can 
learn directly of the aspirations of these nations in their present circumstances. 
I should, next, like to outline Japan's basic frame of reference in devising 
our policies vis-it-vis the Pacific island nations. Let me, first, refer to our 
geographical and historical relationship. Japan, an Asia-Pacific country, has a 
long history of relations with the region. Part of that history is, one knows, the 
tragic experience of the Second World War. Let me assure you that Japan is 
resolutely committed to peace, to not becoming a military power; and that its 
central foreign policy focus is the promotion of friendly and cooperative 
relations with other countries, particularly neighbouring countries. In effect, 
Japan has sought a post-war new deal. It realizes that it cannot be indifferent 
to the problems facing the Pacific island nations in the region it belongs to and 
therefore seeks, in a spirit of neighbourly friendship and open-mindedness, to 
work with them in contributing to their development. 
This frame of reference has, of course, its political dimension. Japan is 
an industrial democracy, and, with the other like-minded nations, has 
important responsibilities in contributing to the solving of problems which 
require global remedies. In the area of security, for example, an approach 
based on a global vision is essential. It is clear that it will become increasingly 
necessary, not only for Japan but for the Western nations as a whole, to look at 
the importance of the peace of the Pacific in a world-wide context; and also that 
the. international community will be paying more and more attention to this 
regIon. 
Working within the framework I have outlined, I should like to take 
advantage of this opportunity today to say something of our basic thinking on 
the development of our relations with the Pacific island states. 
First, Japan will take every care, in promoting bilateral relations, not to 
encroach on independence or hamper autonomous initiatives, whatever the size 
of its partner in the Pacific island region. 
Recently in Micronesia, where the achievement of self government has 
long been the goal of their efforts, steps are being taken to promote this in a 
relationship of free association with the United States. It is a gratifying 
development and Japan heartily welcomes it. Japan will continue to 
strenghthen the ties with this area. 
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Secondly, Japan, a country of the Asia-Pacific community, will support 
and assist existing arrangements for regional cooperation among the island 
states. 
This cooperation has been based upon the traditional values of the region 
known, very appropriately, as the 'Pacific Way'. It has already borne very 
encouraging fruit and those participating can now speak with one voice in the 
international community, particularly through the South Pacific Forum. 
Japan fully recognizes the political significance that the South Pacific 
Forum bears, and I would like to announce today, as one expression of Japan's 
desire to respond adequately to this regional spirit, that Japan will invite the 
Head of [State or] Government of the chair-country of the South Pacific Forum 
and the Director of the SPEC to visit Japan, either immediately before or after 
the annual meeting of the Forum. We shall be doing this as one response to the 
Forum's request for strengthening of its dialogue with Japan. 
Thirdly, Japan will do its utmost to assist in preserving the political 
stability of the Pacific island region. 
However much one may wish it were otherwise, peace and stability 
cannot be maintained without adequate thought being given to global security 
considerations. This principle does not allow of any exception for the Pacific 
region, despite its being geographically far from the world's areas of heightened 
tension. Japan has the very highest regard for the initiatives and efforts of the 
peace-loving island states of the Pacific to maintain peace and stability and 
cannot support the introduction of new tension into this peaceful and 
untroubled region, particularly the South Pacific. 
Fourthly, Japan will provide as much assistance as possible to make the 
region economically more prosperous. Japan intends to expand its economic 
cooperation and to review cooperation modalities in order that their 
effectiveness may be enhanced. Most of the Pacific island states are faced with 
one or more factors making for a fragile economy: lack of resources, dependence 
on a single crop for export income and lack of the advantages of economies of 
scale. They are, however, making determined efforts to overcome these 
problems and to build solid foundations for future development. 
I feel the most profound respect for the way in which so many peoples, 
scattered over this vast Ocean and each facing its own particular difficulties, 
are working together towards a better life for their children and future 
generations. Japan intends to do its utmost to assist those endeavours. 
Japan's assistance to the Pacific island states has grown five times in the last 
10 years, but I have ordered a study of ways to expand Japan's cooperation yet 
further and to accelerate Japan's contribution to the development of this region. 
For this purpose, I shall be sending a government survey mission to this region 
within the present fiscal year, that is, before the end of March, 1987, to 
formulate new guidelines for future bilateral assistance. 
I am pleased to be able to announce also that, subject to Diet approval, 
Japan intends to subscribe two million US dollars for the establishment of a 
special fund for Pacific island states, to be part of the United Nations 
Development Programme, to help promote the development of those countries 
in harmony with the interests of the region as a whole in various fields, among 
them transportation and telecommunications. Furthermore, I believe that we 
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should consider the development of technology which utilizes nature itself, 
which is the precious resource of the island nations. Accordingly, Japan 
intends to contribute one million dollars in the next fiscal year, again subject to 
Diet approval, to the project, 'Open Cycle Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion' at 
the Pacific International Centre for High Technology Research in Hawaii. We 
hope that such increased assitance [sic], along with assistance from other 
countries and with coordination at the SPEC, will make a very significant 
contribution to the development of the whole region. 
Fifthly, Japan values highly face-to-face contacts among nations. In 
preserving the spirit of good neighbourhood into the 21st Century, we must 
promote mutual understanding among the Pacific communities. Special 
emphasis will be placed on exchanges between young people, particularly with 
those who will later play a central role in the nation-building of the Pacific 
island states. It goes without saying that development of a nation's human 
resources-the men and women who must undertake the task of nation-
building-is of fundamental importance to development. More than 130 junior 
leaders, opinion leaders, media people, technical trainees and others of those 
who will bear the future of the island states on their shoulders have already 
been invited this fiscal year to Japan for study, training and so on. I am happy 
to say that these programmes are highly regarded by the Pacific island nations. 
Starting in the present fiscal year, Japan is inviting youths through the 
Friendship program For the Twenty-First Century from Papua New Guinea 
and Fiji. We intend to expand this cooperation further and to promote 
exchanges of people at all levels. 
It is frequently said that the twenty-first century will be the century of 
the Pacific Ocean. The prelude to that new age has, indeed, already begun. 
The countries in the Pacific are deepening their exchanges so as to strengthen 
the relations among them. Already in the Pacific Ocean, we witness a heavy 
traffic of super-tankers and jumbo-jets, which are the fruits of modern 
technology. Above the sky are the satellites, hundreds of them, enabling on-
line broadcasting of television programmes as well as communications among 
people. Hitherto untapped marine resources are now within mankind's reach. 
The flow of people, goods and information has been unleashed through 
technological innovation like so many tides and currents, meeting and parting, 
parting and meeting. All of these factors provide the vitality for the 
development of this vast community. The surge of information, in particular, 
will undoubtedly become a vital element in the future building of this region. 
I share the hope stressed by Prime Minister Nakasone during his visit to 
this region two years ago, that the assistance provided to the peoples of the 
Pacific region will encourage them in their historic task of nation-building. I 
can assure them that Japan will continue to give them the utmost possible 
cooperation in dealing with the great changes which they face. 
I hope most ardently that the Pacific island region may remain forever as 
peaceful as it was when I visited it for the first time a quarter of a century ago. 
I also hope that in developing their natural and human resources, the peoples 
of this region will preserve such universal values as their warm hospitality to 
outsiders; and that the natural beauties of their islands in the emerald sea will 
remain undiminished. I trust that the South Pacific will continue to be for 
mankind a place to which one can always turn for refreshment and spiritual 
sustenance. Are development and conservation incompatible opposites? I do 
not think so. Surely mankind has wisdom enough to attain both. 
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We, who are of the Pacific, shall set to work, helping one another, in this 
difficult but very meaningful task of building 'the Pacific future community'. 
Thank you. 
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